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action,' 2 and the exception1 3 governing the court of review in appeals from
federal courts, has been extended by the cases to appeals from the Board of
Tax Appeals. The rationale of this extension is that the Board has appellate
jurisdiction over the rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and
enjoys the same powers and limitations as federal courts in this respect.1 4
Thus, in the instant case, the Supreme Court, in reversing the Board of
Tax Appeals and affirming the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, applied the exception to the general rule. The record of the case
on appeal contained sufficient facts to uphold the ruling when the correct
section of the statute was applied. The fact that the Commissioner based
his ruling on the wrong section of the statute and failed to invoke the cor-
rect section was of no importance.
R. T. S.
INSURANCE - NoN-FORFEITURE STATUTE - DEDUCTION OF LOAN - [Mis-
souri].-Insured borrowed money on two life insurance policies which con-
tained a clause that any indebtedness to the company would be deducted in
any settlement of the policy but did not provide for deduction of indebted-
ness in computation of paid-up or extended insurance. Insured left the state
and the policies lapsed. A month after lapse, in response to inquiry by
plaintiff beneficiary, insurer notified her that it was issuing extended term
insurance which, after deducting the loan from the cash value, would carry
the policies for five months. She failed to reply to the notice. After the
death of insured five years later, plaintiff demanded payment of the policies,
contending that deduction of the indebtedness from the cash value was
improper and, accordingly, there was sufficient reserve to extend the insur-
ance until the date of death. Insurer contended that its procedure followed
the Missouri non-forfeiture statutes,' and that the period of extended term
insurance had expired. Held, that under the peculiar terms of the policies
insurer was not entitled to deduct the loan from the cash value in computing
the amount to be used for purchase of extended insurance, and that plaintiff
was entitled to recover the amount of extended insurance indicated in the
policies, less the indebtedness. 2
12. Dobbins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1929) 31 F. (2d) 935.
13. In Lewis-Hall Iron Works v. Blair (1928) 23 F. (2d) 972, 974, the
court adopted the statement found in 4 C. J. (1916) 663, that "Where ajudgment or order is correct, it will not be reversed on appeal because the
trial court has based its decision on insufficient or erroneous reasons or
grounds, or has stated no reasons therefor." Helvering v. Gowran (1937)
302 U. S. 238; Hurwitz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1930) 45 F.(2d) 780; Dickey v. Burnet (1932) 56 F. (2d) 917; Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue v. Linderman (1936) 84 F. (2d) 727.
14. Kottemann v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1936) 81 F. (2d)
621.
1. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 5741-5744.
2. Fitzsimmons v. American Union Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1939) 133
S. W. (2d) 680. In Griffin v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1940)
C. C. H. Ins. Law Serv. par. 501,277, the same court allowed judgment on
extended insurance for less than face amount.
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Prior to non-forfeiture statutes, upon lapse the insurer could keep the
entire reserve. Insurers then had little occasion to lend money on the secu-
rity of a policy. Companies more readily lent money from the reserve after
statutes were passed requiring the return of at least the major part of
the reserve on lapse of the policy.3 All legal-reserve life insurance policies,
except those for term insurance, contain non-forfeiture provisions, with
specified procedure to be followed when there is a policy loan. Similar pro-
visions exist by statute in most states. When money is lent from the reserve,
the policy is usually assigned as security and a personal note given by the
insured.
Courts are generally agreed that where the policy so provides an insurer
may deduct the amount of the loan from the reserve before applying non-
forfeiture provisions. 4 The period covered by extended insurance is then
determined by the balance. In some cases courts have given effect to policy
provisions or have construed a statute so as to allow an additional deduction
of the loan from the face amount of the extended insurance so issued.5
Where deduction of the indebtedness from the reserve has been refused,
the reason advanced has been either discrimination against borrowing pol-
icy holders6 or the particular provisions of the policy involved.7. The present
case comes within the latter group.
The Missouri statute, amended since the policies in question were issued,
now provides that, after deducting from three-fourths of the net value the
unpaid portion of any notes given on account of past premium payments
and any other indebtedness secured by said policy, the balance shall be taken
as a net single premium for temporary insurance (extended insurance). 8
3. Note (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 270, 273.
4. Columbian Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasser (1935) 230 Ala. 284, 160 So.
696; Daugherty v. General American Life Ins. Co. (1935) 190 Ark. 245, 78
S. W. (2d) 805; State Life Ins. Co. v. McNeese (Ind. App. 1939) 19 N. E.
(2d) 854; National Life Ins. Co. v. Kuykendoll (1924) 206 Ky. 361,267 S. W.
140; Oppenheimer v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1939) 193 La. 170, 190 So. 369;
Payne v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1916) 195 Mo. App. 512, 191 S. W.
695; Bledsoe v. Midland Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 106 S. W. (2d)
930; Owens v. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. (1934) 206 N. C. 864, 175 S. E.
203.
5. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Davin (C. C. A. 4, 1925) 5 F. (2d) 481;
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 44 F. (2d) 540;
National Life Ins. Co. v. Kuykendoll (1924) 206 Ky. 361, 267 S. W. 140;
Oppenheimer v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1939) 193 La. 170, 190 So. 369; Schoon-
over v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1932) 187 Minn. 343, 245 N. W. 476. For ex-
ample: $2,000 policy, $500 loan indebtedness, $900 reserve; $400 should be
used to purchase $1,500 of extended insurance for the term indicated in
the policy.
6. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Davis (1903) 115 Ky. 404, 73 S. W.
1020; Emig's Adm'r v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (1907) 127 Ky. 588,
106 S. W. 230. But see Scheuer, Wise & Co. v. New York Life Ins. Co.(1919) 203 Ala. 127, 82 So. 157, in which deduction was allowed despite
discriminatory provisions; Dibrell v. Citizens Nat'l Life Ins. Co. (1913)
152 Ky. 208, 153 S. W. 428.
7. Carter v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1919) 264 Pa. 505, 107 Atl. 847.
8. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5741 (R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6151, as amended
by Mo. Laws of 1923, 233).
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Missouri courts have held that the statutory provisions are mandatory in
the sense that any provision in the policy to evade the statute is void and
unenforceable. 9 But in every case where a deduction was allowed the policy
specifically provided for deduction of the loan from cash value before
computation of the period of extended term insurance.10 There was no such
provision in the policies here involved.
Unless the policy provides for the automatic operation of a non-forfeiture
option, the Missouri statute provides that there shall be extended insur-
ance.11 However, if the company has provided a means of computation more
favorable to the insured, the statutory provision for computation of reserve
value does not govern.12
The policies and loan agreements in question provided that any indebted-
ness to the company would be deducted "in any settlement of this Policy."
The court of appeals said that the issue was whether the company had the
right under the policies, in the light of the quoted clause, to deduct the loan
from the cash value and to apply only the balance to purchase extended
insurance. As there was no provision in the policy for automatic non-for-
feiture procedure, the statute was so far applicable as to require extended
term insurance. But the statutory method fixes only the minimum of pro-
tection for avoiding forfeitures. 8 The phrase, "settlement of this policy,"
in the policy and loan agreement provisions, was construed to mean settle-
ment by the acceptance of cash surrender value or final settlement at death.
Therefore, the contractual provisions were more favorable to the insured
than the statutory terms, in that deduction of the loan was to be made only
at "settlement" rather than from the reserve under paid-up or extended in-
surance options, and therefore the policies and loan agreements controlled
on this point?'
The solution of the problems presented by the instant case seems to lie
9. Cravens v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1899) 148 Mo. 583, 50 S. W. 519,
aff'd (1900) 178 U. S. 389; Burridge v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1908)
211 Mo. 158, 109 S. W. 560; Leibing v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1917) 269
Mo. 509, 191 S. W. 250, aff'd (1922) 259 U. S. 209; State ex rel. Heuring v.
Allen (1938) 342 Mo. 81, 112 S. W. (2d) 843. Cf. New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Dodge (1918) 246 U. S. 357; State ex rel. Clark v. Becker (1934) 335 Mo.
785, 73 S. W. (2d) 769.
10. Payne v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1916) 195 Mo. App. 512, 191
S. W. 695; Knapp v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1924) 214 Mo. App.
151, 259 S. W. 862; McGinnis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 78
S. W. (2d) 501; Bledsoe v. Midland Life Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 106
S. W. (2d) 930.
11. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5744; State ex rel. Adams v. Allen (Mo. 1938)
125 S. W. (2d) 854.
12. Gooch v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1933) 333 Mo. 191, 61 S. W.
(2d) 704.
13. Ibid.
14. The court in the instant case relied on Smith v. Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co. (1903) 173 Mo. 329, 72 S. W. 935, which held that cash loans cannot
be deducted. But the Smith case was expressly decided on R. S. Mo. (1899)
sec. 7897, which permitted deductions of premium loans only and not cash
loans. Seven days after the Smith case was decided the statute was amended
to permit deductions of cash loans (Mo. Laws of 1903, 208).
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in better draftsmanship of such contracts. The policies called for deduction
of the indebtedness on final settlement, which was not clearly defined. The
court probably construed the contract, and accordingly enforced it, in a
way different from that contemplated by the draftsman. There is, however,
nothing in the opinion to indicate that, had the policy provided for deduc-
tion of indebtedness from the reserve before application of the balance to
the purchase of extended insurance, the deduction would be improper. 15
S. M. I.
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS-TRADE UNIONS-ADJUDICATION OF IN-
TERNAL DIsPuTEs-[Missourij.-The plaintiffs, forty-two members of a local
union, brought a bill against the two individual defendants who were in con-
trol of the union, asking, among other things, for the defendants' ouster,
for an accounting, and for appointment of a temporary custodial receiver in
aid of the principal relief sought. The evidence showed that the defendants
had misappropriated the funds of the Local, had mismanaged its affairs,
and had threatened to continue to do so; that they had intimidated the
members from seeking relief from tribunals established by the union; and
that resort to union tribunals was useless because of the influence and con-
trol of the defendants. The circuit court appointed a temporary custodial
receiver. From the order refusing revocation of the interlocutory decree
appointing the receiver the defendants appealed. Held, that equity had
jurisdiction to appoint a receiver.'
This case involves two significant points: (1) the jurisdiction of a court
to decide a dispute between the officers of a union and its members before
the remedies provided by the rules of the union have been exhausted, and
(2) the relation between the appointment of a receiver and recognition of
the status of an association as a legal entity.
As a general rule courts will not take jurisdiction over a dispute involv-
ing the internal affairs of an association such as a trade union when the
member who seeks relief has not exhausted the remedies provided by the
association.2 This is so because the relation between the member and the
15. For general7 discussion of the problem involved, see Magee, General
Insurance (1936) 477; Maclean, Life Insurance (5th ed. 1939) 195; Heub-
ner, Life Insurance (3d ed. 1935) 316; 3 Couch, Insurance (1929) 2061, sec.
638; Note (1936) 10 Temple L. Q. 200; Note (1939) 13 Tulane L. Rev. 270;
Note (1937) 113 A. L. R. 606.
1. Robinson v. Nick (Mo. App. 1940) 136 S. W. (2d) 374.
2. Mulroy v. Supreme Lodge (1888) 28 Mo. App. 463; Webster v. Rankins(Mo. App. 1932) 50 S. W. (2d) 746, and eases therein cited; Note (1927)
49 A. L. R. 379. The rule holds true generally even where property rights
are involved: Cameron v. Internat'l Alliance (1935) 118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176
Atl. 692, 97 A. L. R. 594; Mulroy v. Supreme Lodge, supra; Note (1899)
68 Am. St. Rep. 856, 870. See Chaffee, The Internal Affairs of Associations
Not for Profit (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993, 1020-1029. Sometimes it is
stated broadly that courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of an
association: McMurray v. Brotherhood (D. C. W. D. Pa. 1931) 50 F. (2d)
968, aff'd (C. C. A. 3, 1931) 54 F. (2d) 923; Wrightington, The Law of
Unincorporated Associations and Business Trusts (2d ed. 1923) 320.
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